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RECENT DECISIONS
Federal Court Construction of the Jenks Case-In the recent
case of United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corporation,1 a re-
quest by defense counsel for the disclosure of grand jury testimony
of government witnesses without prior scrutiny by the trial judge was
denied. The court in this case held that grand jury proceedings were
of their nature secret, and therefore should be disclosed only where
a clear inconsistency between the testimony of government witnesses
at the time of the trial and during the grand jury proceedings is shown.
The argument of the defense counsel in the Consolidated case
was based upon the decision in Jenks v. United States.2 Their claim
was that the ruling in Jenks made it quite clear that the defense has
a right to see grand jury testimony without prior scrutiny by any other
party. The Jenks case concerned two union officials who were on
trial for allegedly falsely swearing to non-communist affidavits which
were required by the Taft-Hartley Act.3 The F.B.I. had made use
of the informers to gather evidence against the petitioners. At the
time of their testimony the defense counsel (for petitioners) demanded
to see the prior recorded statements of the informers made to the
F.B.I. agents. This was for the purpose of impeaching the witnesses'
testimony. The trial court refused this request because there was no
showing of inconsistency between the testimony of the witnesses at
the trial and their prior statements to F.B.I. agents.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The majority opinion,
delivered by Justice Brennan, rejected the two alternative practices
formerly used by lower courts, that either (1) the defense must show
some inconsistency between the witnesses' statements at the trial and
those previously made to the F.B.I. agent or (2) that the court should
determine in camera4 whether the documents are material and rele-
vant to the cross examination. Justice Brennan ordered all reports of
the informers in the hands of the government to be delivered to
counsel for the petitioners. The reason for this, the Court held, was
that only the defense is adequately equipped to inspect the reports to
determine whether to use them in defense. Order of treatment in the
prior reports, omissions, differences of emphasis must all be ascer-
1159 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. N.Y. 1958).
2353 U.S. 657 (1957).
361 STAT. 143 (1947), as amended 65 STAT. 601 (1951); 29 U.S.C. 159 (h)(1952) provides that ". . . processes of the National Labor Relations Board
will be unavailable to a labor organization unless there is on file with the
Board, an affidavit executed by each officer of such labor organization that
he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party,
and that he does not believe in and is not a member of and does not support
any organization that believes in or teaches the overthrow of the government
by force or by an illegal or unconstitutional means."
4 In chambers or, in other words, in the presence of the judge alone, BLACK'S
LAW DiCrIONARY 929 (3rd Ed. 1933).
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tained by the defense counsel in seeking to impeach the witnesses'
testimony.5 Brennan laid stress upon the fact that the interest of the
United States is a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win its case
but that justice shall be done.6 For this reason the Court felt that
secrecy of Government files must yield to the high standards of
justice required in the enforcement of Federal law.
Basing its reasoning upon the wording of Justice Brennan's
opinion, the defense counsel in the Consolidated case' claimed that
justice emphatically required that they be permitted to examine the
testimony of government witnesses made before the grand jury to see
if there be an inconsistency between this testimony and the testimony
of these witnesses at the trial.
The District Court refused their request and distinguished the
Jenks case from the case at hand. Jenks dealt with the statements
made to F.B.I. investigators outside of court. But the present case was
concerned with grand jury testimony which, the Court stated, has al-
ways been considered secret. The Court said that grand jury testi-
mony may only be divulged when the interests of justice require it.
The Court cites United States v. Socony Vacuums where this rule is
stated. The Supreme Court in Socony Vacuum upheld the trial court's
refusal to let the defendant see the prior statement made by the wit-
ness at the grand jury proceedings, thus allowing the discretion of the
judge to control the point. In the case of United States v. Johnson,9
the Supreme Court uses the word "indispensable" in referring to the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings. For these reasons, and because
the Supreme Court did not refer to grand jury testimony in the Jenks
decision, the court ruled that grand jury minutes will only be disclosed
to defense counsel when some inconsistency with the testimony at the
trial arises from a reading of the minutes of the grand jury.10 The
Court held that the judge must decide whether this inconsistency
exists.
Important also in the consideration of this case is the insight it
gives into the recent statute which was passed to modify the Jenks
decision.' This statute defines the type of statement to be governed
by Jenks as "a statement signed by the witness himself or a statement
made to an F.B.I. agent and transcribed by him verbatim or nearly
verbatim.'1 2 It is quite clear from a reading of the statute that grand
jury testimony is not included within the definition. Because the Con-
5 Supra note 2, at 667.
6 Ibid, at 668.
7 Supra note 1.
8 310 U.S. 150, at 233-234 (1940).
11319 U.S. 503, at 513 (1943).
10 Supra note 1 at 868.
1171 STAT. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. 3500, Supp. V (1958).
12 Ibid, Subsection (e).
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gressional intent seemed clear in this respect, the Court concluded that
from the language of Congress, Jenks was not meant to extend to
disclosure of grand jury testimony.
A cloud has been placed over the Consolidated case by the recent
Supreme Court decision, United States v. Proctor and Gamble."
Justice Douglas, in writing the majority decision in this case, cited
United States v. Socony Vacuum'4 approvingly, when discussing the
question of the use of proper discretion by a trial judge in allowing
defense counsel to see the grand jury transcript. But he also made
this statement.
We do not reach in this case problems concerning the use
of the grand jury transcript at the trial to impeach a witness,
to refresh recollections, to test his credibility and the like.
Those are cases of particularized need where the secrecy of the
proceedings is lifted discretely and limitedly. 15
This case was decided by a divided Court and Justice Douglas
was joined in his opinion by only four of his brethren. It is ques-
tionable whether the statement requires the inference that the trial
judge may not scrutinize the testimony before handing it over to de-
fense counsel. It is even more questionable whether Justice Whit-
taker who concurred or the three dissenting Justices would join
Douglas in his dictum. However, as it stands the statement seems to
bode ill for the Consolidated case and a good deal of appellate activity
can be expected in the particular fact area which it represents.
Consolidated Laundries is only one of the many recent cases in-
terpreting the fenks decision which have been handed down by U.S.
district and appellate courts. From these decisions the scope of Jenks
has become more clear and it is now possible to make a few gen-
eralizations concerning its application in modern practice.
The one point that seems clear from recent cases is that the Jenks
decision refers only to requests for disclosure of testimony after the
witness has taken the stand. In short Jenks does not apply to pre-
trial disclosure of F.B.I. witnesses' testimony.
In United States v. Benson,' Judge Palmieri, the author of the
Consolidated decision, discussed the rule which has been followed by
most district and appellate courts.' 7
As I read the Supreme Court majority and concurring
opinions, I find no language which would justify its application
13 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
'14310 U.S. 150, at 233-234 (1940).
15 Supra note 13, at 683.
1620 F.R.D. 602 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
1 Followed by United States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813 (D. N.J. 1957);
United States v. Anderson, 154 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mo. 1957) ; United States
v. Grado approves and cites the opinion, United States v. Grado, 154 F. Supp.878, at 880 (W.D. Mo. 1957); Contra: United States v. Hall, 153 F. Supp.
661, at 664 (N.D. Ky. 1957).
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to pre-trial procedure. Close scrutiny of the opinions in the
Jenks case reveals no reference to Rule 16 or Rule 17 or to dis-
closure in advance of trial. Moreover it appears from the briefs
before the Supreme Court that they contain no arguments
urging pre-trial disclosure of statements of potential Govern-
ment witnesses. Indeed the very touchstone of the Jenks de-
cision is the issue of credibility of witnesses at the trial.
Before the defense is entitled to disclosure of any state-
ments made by a Government witness for the purpose of dis-
crediting him the credibility of the witness whose prior state-
ments are sought must be in issue."'
The case of United States v. Grossmano adopts the rule of Justice
Palmieri above and gives an additional reason for its decision. The
Court states that to allow pre-trial disclosure of witnesses' testimony
is to give the defense a list of the Government witnesses before trial.
a procedure which it holds is unfair since it is quite possible that the
Government may never use these witnesses.
20
The extension of the Jenks decision in this regard is outlined by
Judge Moore in United States v. Anderson :21
1. Before the defendant in a criminal cause is entitled to
production and inspection of a statement made by a person
other than himself in the possession of the United States, (a)
such person must have been called as a witness by the United
States, (b) the defendant must establish on cross-examination
that a statement was made by such witness, (c) that such
statement is in the possession of the United States and (d)
that such statement touches the events and activities related in
his direct examination.
2. Such statement must either have been written by the
witness or recorded verbatim or nearly SO.
2 2
The new Jenks statute23 seems to bear out the conclusions that
Judge Palmieri and Judge Moore reached concerning pre-trial dis-
closure. It reads:
.. . no statement or report in the possession of the United
States which was made by a Government witness or prospective
Government witness other than the defendant, to an agent of
the Government shall be subject to subpoena, discovery or
inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination
in the trial of the case.
2
1
is 20 F.R.D. 602, at 604 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
19 154 F. Supp. 813 (D. N.J. 1957).
20 Ibid, at 815.
21 154 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mo. 1957).
22 Ibid, at 375.
23 71 STAT. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. 3500 (1958).
24 Ibid, subsection (b). In United States v. Papworth, 156 F. Supp. 842, at
851 and 853 (N.D. Tex. 1957), the Court applies the statute here cited and
also accepts Judge Moore's interpretation of the Jenks decision.
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The statute makes clear the fact that the Jenks decision does not
refer to pre-trial disclosure of F.B.I. witnesses' testimony; but Rule
17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure25 still applies to
disclosure in such cases. However, persuasive authority holds that
the use of Rule 17(c) will be subject to broad discretion by the trial
court.
26
There have been many cases dealing with the procedures to be
used in applying Jenks. For example, in Stanley z. United States
-2 7
the court held that defendant's counsel must demand the written testi-
mony of the Government witnesses during the time of trial and not
after sentence has been imposed. If defense counsel waives his right
to see the testimony and asks the court to determine whether there is
anything material and relevant in the testimony, he cannot later assert
a right to see the testimony.28 Franken v. United States" held that
a duplicate copy of the witnesses' testimony would serve the purposes
of justice and the original is not required. Finally the recent case of
United States v. Waldman"° held that though the Jenks statute does
not refer to statements taken down in longhand but rather to state-
ments taken down in shorthand or by some mechanical device, the
court felt that longhand statements were obviously included in the
definition.31
Quite a number of recent decisions have dealt with the effect of
the fenks decision on the conscientious objector cases. In these cases
the person claiming conscientious objector status files a sworn state-
ment to the effect that he cannot serve in the armed forces because
of religious or moral suasions he holds. He is then classified by
the local Selective Service Board which makes a judgment as to his
sincerity. If he disagrees with the decision of the Board, he may
appeal his case to the Appeal Board. On his appeal an F.B.I. agent
will interview numerous acquaintances of the petitioner to determine
the nature of his "sincerity." The F.B.I. agent will submit his report
and a resume to a local hearing officer and to the F.B.I. also. Only
25 Fed. R. Crim. P. 17 (c). "Discovery and Inspection: Upon motion of a
defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or information, the
court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to
inspect the copy or photograph, designated books, papers, documents, or
tangible objects obtained from or belinging to the defendant or obtained from
others by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the items sought may be
material to the presentation of his defense and that the request is reasonable."
2 In United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, at 371 (D. D.C. 1954), Judge
Holtzoff gives as his view the rule that an application under this rule will be
subject to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See also 56 Mich. L.
Rev. 314, at 317 (1957). For an excellent treatment of this subject of pretrial
devices, see Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 492, at 494-495 (1954).27249 F. 2nd 64, at 66 (6th Cir. 1957).
28 United States v. Volkell, 251 F. 2d 333, at 337 (2nd Cir. 1957).
29248 F. 2d 789, at 790 (3rd Cir. 1957).
30 159 F. Supp. 747 (D. N.J. 1958).
31 Ibid, at 749.
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a resume will be given to the petitioner. Both the hearing officer and
the F.B.I. will submit a recommendation to the Appeal Board. The
Appeal Board will also be given the resume, but they will not see the
original report of the F.B.I. agent.3 2
The United States Supreme Court in Nugent v. United States2 3
held that as long as the Appeal Board is shown a fair resume, the
requirements of due process as to the resume will have been fulfilled.34
Nevertheless, the contention of the defendant in Blalock v. United
States3 5 was that today under the Jenks rule the conscientious ob-
jector has a right to demand that the whole report be submitted to
the Appeal Board, or if not to the Appeal Board then to the District
Judge who will impose sentence if the defendant cannot show cause
why the Appeal Board's ruling should not be reversed. The conten-
tion was that the whole basis of Jenks is that no official should ar-
bitrarily be allowed to decide what testimony is material and relevant
to the investigation. The accused, it is said, has a right to have all of
the testimony presented to the defense counsel so that any contradic-
tions in the testimony may be exposed in open court by defense coun-
sel.316 The Court in Blalock37 admitted that the reasoning was appeal-
ing but stated that the Nugent"8 case still rules the conscientious ob-
jector problem.
The case of Bouziden v. United States39 indicates many of the
reasons for the court's reluctance to accept the reasoning of the con-
scientious objectors. In the first place the conscientious objector is
seeking a legislative exemption to which he has no asolute right. There-
fore, as long as the legislative procedure is followed, the court will
not interfere unless due process has been violated. Secondly, the
Jenks case involves a statement concerning an alleged crime, whereas
in this case the 'resume' only contains the statement of witnesses
which attest to the sincerity or insincerity of the applicant's beliefs.
Hence, if the 'resume' gives a fair account of the adverse evidence,
and the Appeal Board has based its decision on some credible evidence,
the courts will not interfere and the conscientious objector will have
to state his case without the original report of the F.B.I. agent.40
3250 U.S.C. Appendix 456j (1952). The procedure is explained in United
States v. Gordon, 158 F. Supp. 207, at 209 (N.D. Il1. 1958).
33346 U.S. 1, at 8 (1953).
34 Ibid, at 8.
35247 F. 2d 615 (4th Cir. 1957).
36 Ibid, at 620.
37Ibid.
38 Supra note 33.
39 251 F. 2d 728, at 731-732 (10th Cir. 1957).
40 Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397, at 405 (1955) gives a definition of a
fair resume. "A fair resume is one which will permit the registrant to defend
against the adverse evidence, to explain it, rebut it, or otherwise detract
from its damaging force."
[Vol. 4-2
RECENT DECISIONS
These cases will seemingly be upset by the Supreme Court only if
it finds that the Jenks decision was founded upon the principles of
fundamental justice.41  If the Court should find that the Jenks de-
cision states a rule which is the very fiber of due process and not
merely a new rule for the federal judiciary,42 the conscientious ob-
jector cases will meet with the Court's displeasure. Quite possibly the
Jenks statute will be called unconstitutional since it restricts a ruling
which is an expression of due process. If such a result should occur,
it is quite possible that the Jenks ruling would be extended to pre-
trial disclosure and to disclosure of grand jury testimony. The better
opinion seems to be that since the Supreme Court did not mention
due process, it was merely exercising its rule-making power.43 If this
opinion is correct, the cases discussed here will probably not be over-
ruled. Nevertheless, the Jenks decision has not been relegated to the
history books by the new statute and it will continue to arouse a
great deal of discussion and controversy.
ROBERT ULRICH
Contracts-Insurer's Breach-Application of Rest. of Con-
tracts §318-Plaintiff was the beneficiary under a fifteen year en-
dowment policy with family income provisions taken out by her de-
ceased spouse. On the original application, insured received a 20-
year endowment policy with family income provisions for a twenty
year term, dated February 1, 1939. A few months after receipt of
this policy, insured made application to convert the policy to the 15-
year endowment with the income provisions for fifteen years. The
41 United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860, at 868 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958). See also 56 Mich. L. Rev. 314, at 316 (1957).42 In United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860, at 868(S.D. N.Y. 1958), judge Palmieri states: "The constitutionality of 18 U.S.-
C.A. 3500 (Supp. V.) has been implicitly recognized by the Second Circuit in
United States v. Miller, 248 F. 2d 163, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 905 (1957), in
which the Court held that upon remand the procedure to be followed in pro-
ducing documents would be that established by the statute." In footnote 15,
the Judge states: "There is no indication that either the Jenks or Gordon deci-
sions rested on a constitutional basis."
43Supra note 41.
44 In a recent decision, Scales v. United States, 260 F. 2d 21 (4th Cir. 1958) which
appeared subsequent to the writing of this article, the 4th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals passed upon the question of the constitutionality of subsection (c) of the
new statute. The Court stated that the procedure to be followed under subsec-
tion (c) of the statute does not violate due process of law. but is merely a
procedural regulation within the power of Congress to enact. The Court
seems to withdraw somewhat from the language of the Jenks case. It says:
"The standard set by Jenks, 353 U.S. at 669, that justice requires no less than
that the defense be entitled to see the reports to determine what use may be
made of them is satisfied [by the new statute] and justice requires no more."
[Italics ours]. The rest of the Jenks statute has not been passed upon but
from the language of the Court in this case, it seems probable that the
statute will weather attacks on the grounds of its constitutionality, providing
the United States Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts.
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